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NOTE AND COMMENT

WHAT IS THE PRACTICE oF MEDICINE?-In a popular sense, and as ordinarily understood the practice of medicine is the applying of medical or
surgical agencies for the purpose of preventing, relieving, or curing disegse,
or aiding natural functions, or modifying or removing the results of physical
injury. Stewart v. Raab, 55 Minn. 20, 56 N. W. Rep. 256. But in some relations, and for some pfirposes, the expression has a more extended meaning.
This is to be found sometimes in statutory provisions, sometimes in the
decisions of the courts upon questions involving the construction of the
expression and sometimes in both. Medical acts not infrequently state what
shall be deemed to be the practice of medicine under them. But even where
this is so, the courts are often called upon to interpret the Words of the legis-
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lature and to'determine whether or not certain acts of a party make him a
practitioner of medicine within the meaning of the governing statute. Where
the medical act contains no direct provisidn in regard to the matter, the court,
in case of litigation, must determine what is the practice of medicine, and in
so doing must take into consideration the general scope and purpose of the
statute. The medical statutes have been enacted primarily for the protection
of the public, although incidentally the medical profession are protected by
these laws. The difficult cases are not those where a person attempts to heal
disease by the use of drugs or ordinary appliances, but rather those where
resort is had to new. or extraordinary methods. Some of 'the ways in which
this question has arisen appear in the following paragraphs.
In the recent case of State v. Yegge (S. Dak.), io3 N. W. Rep. 17, 69 L.
R. A. 504, it was contended that" the defendant was practicing medicine in
violation of the statute of the state which provided that "When a person shall
append or prefix the letters 'M.B.' or 'M.D.,' or the title 'Dr.' or 'Doctor,' or
any other sign or appellation in a medical sense, to his or her name, or shall
profess publicly to be a physician or surgeon, or who shall prescribe or direct
for the use of any'person any drug, medicine, apparatus, or other agency for
the cure, relief or palliation of any ailment or disease of the mind or body. or
for th'e cure or relief of any wound, fracture, or bodily injury or deformity,
after having received, or with the intent of receiving therefor, either directly
or indirectly, any bonus, gift or compensation, he or she shall be regarded as
practicing within the meaning of this act." It seems that the defendant was
a practitioner of what he called "ophthalmology", that he advertised himself
as such, and that he claimed in his advertisements that certain specifid diseases
could be cured by removing the causes through the use of his methods. He
administered no drugs or .medicines of any kind, but treated his patients
simply by the fitting of glasses. His advertisements were. signed 'Dr. -I.F.
Yegge." It was contendied on the part of the defendant that the evidence
was insufficient to warrant his conviction in that it failed to show that he was
practicing or attempting to practice medicine within the piovisidns of the act
quoted, anat that he was simply engaged in the business of fitting glasses to
the eye. But the court held that it was not only clear from the language of
the advertisement which was in evidence that it would be 'generally understood that ie was holding himself out as a regular physician, or at least a
specialist in the branch of medicine treating of ophthalmology, but that he
was plainly within the statute by reason of having prefixed the term "Dr." to
his name when signing his advertisements. "The legislature," says the'court,
"evidently intended in enacting the law fo prevent persons not properly
educated in the science of medicine from assuming to act as physicians and
to protect the public. * * * The law should not be so construed as to deprive
the people of the benefits. intended by the act, but such a construction should
be given it as to carry into effect the evident intention of the legislature." A
case, somewhat similar to the foregoing .arose in the state of Illinois. where
the medical act provides that any person shall be considered a medical practitioner within the meaning of the act, "who shall treat or profess to treat.
operate on, or prescribe for any physical ailment or any physical injury to, or
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deformity of, another." Hurd's Ill. Stat. (i9o3) Chap. 91, Sec. ii
In
People v. Smith, 208 Ill.31, 69 N. R. Rep. 8io, it was held that 'rae who
travels from place to place fitting and selling spectacles, and who advertises
himself as "The Famous Chicago Eye Expert," and inv:'-.; persons having
the symptoms described to call upon him, but stating .nat he does not give
medical or surgical treatment, is not within the provisions of the medical act
of the state.
Sometimes the statute regulating the practice of medicine provides that the
statute shall only apply to those practicing for reward or compensation.
State v. Paul, 56 Neb. 369, 76 N. W. Rep. 86i; State v. Pirlot,20 R. I. 273,
38 Atl. Rep. 656; State v. Hale, I5 Mo. 606; State v. Wilcox, 64 Kan. 789,, 68
Pac. Rep. 634; Blalock v. State, 112 Ga. 338, 37 S. E. Rep. 361. In the
absence of such a provision, one may be a practitioner within the nieaning of
the governing statute although he does not practice for compensation. State
v. Welch, "129 N. C. 579, 40 S. E. Rep. 12o. But ordinarily it would not be
held to be the practice of medicine to give advice or medicine to a sick person
in a friendly or neighborly way, the person performing such services not holding himself out as a physician, or charging for his services. The legislature
in the exercise of its police power might, perhaps, prohibit such friendly
services, but in the absence of a direct prohibition in regard to the matter, the
rendering of them would not ordinarily be the practice of medicine. Nelson
v. State, 97 Ala. 79, 12 South. Rep. 42i. Gratuitous medical services rendered*
in case of an emergency would not be the practice of medicine. Greenfield v.
Gilmdit, i4o N. Y. i68, 35 N. E..Rep. 435. An exception in regard to such
ser'vices will be found in- some of the- medical acts. State v. Paul, s6 Neb.
369, 76 N. W. Rep. 861. But in order that the emergency exception of a
statute may apply, the emergency must be a real one; the'situation must be
such as to demand immediate medical aid in order that life or health may
not be endangered. People v. Lee Wah, 71 Cal. 8o, iiPac. Rep.'851.
Where it was provided in an act making it a misdemeanor to practice
medicine without first having obtained a certificate of qualification from one
of the authorized boards oi medical examiners, that the act should not apply
"to any physician practicing medicine in this state for the past five years," it
was held that the word "physician" was used in its popular sense, as one who
practices medicine or the healing art, and that one who continued the practice of medicine for the time mentioned in the statute, although without a
certificate of qualification, was within the proviso of the statute. Harrisonv.
State, io2 Ala. 170, 15 South. Rep. 563. But in this connection it should be
noted that in Iowa the attitude of the Supreme Court upon a somewhat similar questi6n is different. It is held by this court that a provision of the
medical act of that state to the effect that a physician shall riot by the act be
prohibited from practicing if he has been in practice in the state for five consecutive years, three of which have been in one locality, provided satisfactory
evidence of such practice be furnished the state board of examiners and a
proper certificate secured from said board, does not give such physician a
right to the certificate of the said board upon proof by him of the fact 6f hi!
practice as provided in the statute. The court takes the position that the
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-board in such a case may.pass upon the competency of the applicant to practice medicine, not because the act expressly provides that this may be done,
but because such authority in the board is in accorda~nce with the spirit and
purpose of the law. State v. Mosher, 78 Ia. 321, 43 N. W. Rep. 202.
Some. of the medical statutes require special certificates for different departments of practice, but this is an exceptional provision. Usually the certificate from the state board in terms confers the right to practice medicine
and surgery in the state, and this means to pfactice medicine and.surgery in
any of their branches. But sometimes the act provides for the regulation of
the "practice of medicine," and the certificate from the examining board
authorizes the holder "to practice medicine" in the state. The term "practice medicine" as so used has been held to signify the practice of medicine in
all of its branches, including surgery. Stewart v. Raab, 55 Minn. 20, 56 N. W.
Rep. 256.
A question that has of late frequently challenged the attention of the
courts is whether or not the practice of osteopathy as a profession and means
of livelihood, is the practice of medicine within the provisions of the medical
acts, Each case, of course, has necessarily been considered with reference to
the language of the medical act in force where it arose. An examination of
the acts and decided cases, however, will disclose the fact that similar language in different statutes has been differently construed by the courts of last
resort. This subject was fully considered in i MIcH. LAW Rev. 309, where all
of the cases that had come before the courts of last resort up to the time of the
writing of the note were reviewed. See also 2 MicH. LAW Rv. 51 for a supplemental note upon the subject. It may be suggested here that osteopathy
has been held to be the practice of medicine within the medical acts of
Alabama, N ebraska and Illinois. 'The Ohio act of i896 provided that "Any
person shall be regarded. as practicing medicine within the meaning of this
act who shall * * * for a fee, prescribe, direct, or recommend for the use of
any person any drug, or medicine, or other agency for the treatment, cure, or
relief of any wound, fracture, or bodily injury, infirmity, or disedse." In
State v. Liffring, 6I Ohio St. 39, the Supreme Court of the state held that
osteopath was not an "agency" within the meaning of the act. The reasoning upon which this conclusion was based was that the meaning of the word
"agency" was limited by the associated words "drug" and -"medicine," and
that nothing could be regarded as an "agency" as the word was used in the
act, that did not partake in some way of the general character of a drug or
medicine, and that could not be applied or administered as drugs or medicines usually are. After the decision in this case, the Ohio statute was
amended so as to include within its operation those "who shall prescribe, or
who shall recommend, for a fee for like use, any drug or medicine, appliance,
application, operation, or treatment, of whatever nature, for the cure or relief
of any wound, fracture, or bodily injury, infirmity, or disease." 94 Ohio
Laws (igoo) I97-2o. The statute as amended has been construed by the
Supreme Court of the state to include the practice of osteopathy. State v.
Gravett, 65 Ohio St. 28g. In Kentucky the Supreme Court regards the practitioner of osteopathy as on the rlane -of the trained nurse and as not within
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the provisions of the statute. Nelson v. State Board 'of Health, 68 Ky. 769,
57 S. W. Rep. 5oi, 5o L. R. A. 383.
The legislature of North Carolina in i9o3 amended the fnedical act of the
state by passing a law defining the "practice of medicine and surgery." It is
in the following terms: "For the purposes of this act the expression 'practice
of medicine and surgery' shall be construed to mean the management, for fee
or reward, of any case of disease, physical or mental, real or imaginary, with
or without drugs, surgical operation, surgical or mechanical appliances, or by
any othdr 'method, whatsoever: Provided, that this shall not apply to midwives nor to nurses; Provided further,. that applicants not belonging to -a
regular school 'of medicine shall not. be requireC" to stand an examination
except upon the branches taught in their respective colleges (such branches
being given in the act) ; Provided, that this act shall nbt apply to any person
who ministers to or cures the sick or suffering by prayer to Almighty God
without the use of any drug or material means."
In State v. Biggs, 133 N. C. 729, 46 S. E. Rep. 4o, 64 L. R. A. "I39, the
defendant was. indicted upon the charge of unlawfully and wilfully engiging
in the practice' bf medicine, and surgery for fee or reward without haiving
obtained 'from the state board of' medical examiners a license so to do.
Upon the facts found in a special verdict, the court below adjudged the
defendant guilty. It appeared that he advertised himself as a "nonmedical
physician;" that he held himself out to the public to cure disease by a
"system of drugless healing," and to treat "patients by said system without
medicine;" that the acts that he was found to have perfornued were to
administer massage baths and physical culture, to manipulate the muscles,
bones, spine, etc., and to advise his patients as to,.diet. He used no drugs in
his treatment. The defendant admitted that he had no license from the state
board and claimed no exemptions by virtue of the provisos in the act. It
was iound that he had treated patients since the'passage of the act and had
received compensation therefor. The defendant's acts undoubtedli brought
him within the statutory provisions above quoted, but the Supreme Court
found that he was not guilty, as the police power does not confer upon the
legislature authority so to define the practice of medicine and surgery that
it shall include "the management, for fee or reward, of any case of disease,
physical or mental, real or imaginary, with or without drugs, surgical operation, surgical or mechanical appliances, or.by any other method whatsoever."
"The act," says the court, "means m6re than its friends probably' intended,
for it says 'any case of disease, physical or mental, real or imaginary.' Is
not a disease of the eye physical, and' is not a disease of the ear, or of the
'teeth, or a headache, or a corn, physical? " Then every dentist and aurist and
oculist is indictable unless he has also license from'the state medical society
as an M.D., as is also every corn doctor who relieves aching feet,; and every
peripatetic of stentorian lungs, on the court house square who banishtes headaches, real or imaginary, by rubbing his hands over some credulous brow.
* * * Then there is the closing expression, forbidding treatment 'for fee
or reward,' by other than an M.D., 'by any other method whatsoever.'
This would take in all the old women and the herb doctors, wh,-without pre-
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tending to be professional nurses, relieve much human suffering, real or
imaginary, for a small compensation. Then it is forbidden-to relieve a case
of suffering, physical or mental, in any method unless-one is an M.D. It
is not even admissible to 'minister to a mind diseased' in any method, or even
dissipate an attack of the blues, without that label duly certified. * * *
The act is too sweeping. Besides, the legislature could no more enact that
'the practice of medicine and surgery' shall mean 'practice without medicine
and surgery,' than it could provide that 'two and two make five,' because it
cannot change a physical fact. And when it forbade all treatment of all
diseases, mental or physical, without' surgery or 'medicine, or by any other
method, for a fee or reward, except by an M.D., it attempted to confer a
monopoly on that method of treatment, and this is forbidden by the constitution."
This legislation is, .perhaps, subject to some of the criticisms made upon
it by the court in this case, and possibly the conclusion reached by the court
as to the constitutionality of the act is correct, though it may be said in
passing that the language of the judge writing the opinion is hardly judicial
in chatcter. Two members of the court concur.in the result reached, probably for the reason. that they do not countenance the language used in the
"opinion.' The North Carolina court) as indicated by the
holding in this case,
is evidently not In sympathy with the notion that meidical legislation should
be so comprehensive in its range thatxnone can properly practice medicine in
any of its forms excepting those who have been thoroughly trained so to do.
In the opinion of this court, such legislation should be confined to provisions
in regard to the admission to some branch of the regular medical profession.
The court says: 'The public have the right to know that those holding
themselves out as members of that ancient and honorable profession are
competent and duly licensed as such. The legislature can exercise its police
power to that end because it is a profession whose practice requires the
highest skill and learning. But there are methods of treatment which do
not require much skill and learning, if any. Patients have the right to use
such methods if they wish, and the attempt to require an examination of the
character abdve recited for the application of such treatment is not warranted
:by any legitimate exercise of the police power. The effect would be to prohibit, to those who wish itthose cheap and simple remedies, and deprive those
who practice them of their humble gains, by either giving a monopoly of such
remedies to those who have the title M.D., or prohibiting the use of such
remedies altogether, neither -of ,'hich results the legislature could have contemplated." It may be suggested that so narrow a construction of the police
power in connection with medical- legislation would result in very little protection to the public from designing quacks and pretenders. A statute similar
to that of North Carolina, above quoted, has been upheld by the Supreme
Court of New Mexico. Territory of Neu, Mexico v. Newman, (N. M.), 79
Pac. Rep. 7o6, 813, 68 L. R. A. 783.
The practice of Christian science, so-called, has been held by the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island not to be the practice of medicine within the provisions of the medical act of the state. State ex rel Swartr v. Mylod, 2o R. I.
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632, 4o Atl. Rep. 753, 41 L. R. A.'428. But in Nebraska one who practices
Christian science has been held- to be subject to the medical act of the state.
State v. Biuswell,.4o Neb. 158. The mdical act of Illinois coritains an express
provision that it shall not apply to "any person who ministers. to, or treats,
the sick or 'suffering, by mental 'or spiritual means without the use of any
drug or material remedy." Hurd's Ill. Stat. (x9o3) Chap. 91, Sec. ii.
A magnetic healer who advertised~ hiiself as such and styled himself
"professor" has been held to be subject to the restrictions of 'the statute
requiring a license of persons who annbimce to the public a readiness to cure
disease, or who in .connection with their names use the word "professor," or any other title, intending theieby.to 'designate themselves as practitioners of medicine in any of its branches: Parks v. State, 159 Ind..2I, 64
N.. E. Rep. 862, 5g L. R. A. ixo. Ahd a medical clairvoyant has been held to.
be a practitioner of medicine within the provisions of the statute making thie
recovery of compensation for medical or surgical services dependent upon 'a
compliance with a statute in regard to professional attainments, moral character, etc. Bibber v. Simpson, 59 Me. i81. But it has been held that a peison who recommends and offers for sale an instrument or appliance .to be
attached to the body for the cure of 'disease is riot practicing medicine within
the meaning of the provision of the Illinois act hereinbefore quoted. People'
v.. Lehr, 196 Ill. 361, 63 N. E. Rep. 725. The vendor of proprietary medi"cines who simply sells the medicines and does not attempt to diagnose
disease and prescribe his remedy, 'is not a" practitioner of medicine, yet he
may become such by holding himself out as a physician and varying his pre-'
scriptions of proprietary remedies, to meet the symptoms discovered by'him
on his own examination. State v. Van Doran, iog N. C. 864, 87o, 871, 14 S.
E. Rep. 32; Payize y. State, 11 Tenn. 587, 79 S. W. Rep. 1o25; Regina'v.
Howarth, 24 Ont. 56r. If in selling' proprietary medicines the vendor distinctly declares that.he is not a physician, and receives pay simply for the
medicine, he could not be 'held to be a medical practitioner, even though he
gives advice as to'the use of. his medicine. Commonwealth v. ,t. Pierre, 175
Mass. 48,55 'N; E. Rep. 482.
It may properly be suggested that the medical laws .as a rule-are framed
witb a view of reaching conditions existing at the time of their enactment,
and that they are often in'effectiye because of a failure to proyide by comprehensive language for changed conditions. By reason'of this fact, as an examination of the statutes and decided cases will show, the.ignorant and
'designing pretender who is foisting upon. the public some new but worthless'
and perhaps harmful treatment is not infrequently 'beyond the reach of the
H. B. H.
law.

